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STATE REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS IN A
FEDERALLY DEREGULATED MARKET:
THE TRAGEDY OF THE
COMMONS REVISITED
Richard J. Pierce, Jr. t
In Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Board
(Transco)' a five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court held uncon-
stitutional an order of the Mississippi Oil & Gas Board requiring
that a pipeline purchase natural gas ratably from each of several
owners of a common source of supply. Writing for the majority,
Justice Blackmun held that the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA)2 pre-
empted the order. InJustice Blackmun's view, "Mississippi's action
directly undermines Congress' determination that the supply, the
demand, and the price of... gas be determined by market forces." 3
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the four dissenting Justices, saw no
such conflict between state and federal goals. Indeed, Justice Rehn-
quist saw the state action as a desirable, perhaps even essential, ele-
ment of the decontrolled market in natural gas that Congress had
sought to achieve: "State regulation that merely defines property
rights or establishes contractual rules, however, does not interfere
with this purpose. Markets depend on such rules to function
efficiently." 4
Both the majority and the dissent predicate their opinions on
important principles. When Congress determines that a market
should operate free from the distortive effects of federal price regu-
lation, that statutory determination should also foreclose the poten-
tially more distortive effects of many forms of state regulation. 5
t George W. Hutchison Professor of Energy Law, Southern Methodist University.
B.S., 1965, Lehigh University; J.D., 1972, University of Virginia. I am grateful to Ste-
phen L. McDonald,Jacqueline L. Weaver, and Stephen F. Williams for very helpful com-
ments on an earlier version of this Article.
1 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982).
3 474 U.S. at 422.
4 Id. at 433 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
5 See, e.g., Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
375, 384 (1983) ("a federal decision to forego a regulation in a given area may imply an
authoritative federal determination that the area is best left unregulated") (emphasis
added); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 178 (1978) (state's ban of supertank-
ers invalid because of conflict with federal policy that regulation in the field is inappro-
priate); see also O.W. HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295-96
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Congress made just such a determination with respect to the market
for natural gas in 1978 when it enacted the NGPA to provide for
gradual federal deregulation of the wellhead market for natural
gas. 6
As the dissenting Justices emphasized, however, markets cannot
function efficiently in the absence of clear, enforceable property
rights.7 Unless states can regulate in ways that eliminate or reduce
imperfections in property rights, a federal policy of relying on mar-
ket forces to determine the supply, demand, and price of gas will fall
well short of maximizing social welfare. Garrett Hardin explained
the problem in his classic article, "The Tragedy of the Commons.",
If property rights are held in common, important costs and benefits
are externalized, and waste of natural resources is inevitable. For
example, an individual herdsman on a common pasture would ra-
tionally seek to increase his herd even to the point of overgrazing;
he will receive all the gain from the addition to the herd, but the
effects of overgrazing will be spread out among all the other
herdsmen. Similarly, an individual owning land over a natural gas
field would want to produce as much gas as possible, even if her
action reduces the amount of recoverable reserves in the field, be-
cause she will directly reap the benefits from the additional produc-
tion, while the diminution in the field's reserves will be shared by all
the other owners.9 As Hardin noted, "[t]herein is the tragedy. Each
man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd
without limit-in a world that is limited."' 0
All nine Justices seemed to recognize the nature of the chal-
(1920); Pierce, Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power to
Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. Pr. L. REV. 607, 613-14, 669-70 (1985).
6 For a discussion of the salient features of the NGPA's regulatory structure, see
Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural Gas Industry, 97
HARv. L. REV. 345, 348-50 (1983).
7 474 U.S. at 433.
8 Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); see also Baden &
Stroup, Externality, Property Rights, and the Management of Our National Forests, 16 J.L. &
ECON. 303 (1973) (current forest management policies leave problems of inefficiency
and inequity unresolved); Sweeney, Tollison & Willett, Market Failure, the Common-Pool
Problem, and Ocean Resource Exploitation, 17J.L. & EcON. 179 (1974) (arguing that interna-
tional regulation is needed to reduce inefficiencies associated with ocean bed
exploitation).
9 Hardin, supra note 8, at 1244. As early as 1932 the Court recognized the signifi-
cant imperfections in the right to own gas under the surface of the earth. See, e.g., Cities
Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 185-86 (1950) (noting that state
legislatures restrict the use of property to prevent waste of natural resources and protect
correlative rights of owners through ratable taking); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma
Corp. Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 233 (1932) (plaintiff does not have a vested right to take
all the natural flow of oil and gas--"if plaintiff should take all the flow of its wells, there
would inevitably result great physical waste").
10 Hardin, supra note 8, at 1244.
[Vol. 73:15
STATE REGULA TION OF NATURAL GAS
lenging task they confronted in Transco-a state regulation is invalid
if it conflicts with the federal goal of relying on market forces; it is
valid, however, if it complements federal efforts to achieve that goal.
Yet the Justices were almost equally divided in their resolution of
this question, and neither the majority opinion nor the dissent pro-
vides an analytical framework that a court might apply to the many
other forms of regulation of gas that many producing states are now
implementing. The range of state action is extremely broad,11 and
each type of action interacts differently with the federal goal of es-
tablishing a properly functioning gas market. 12 The courts will have
many more occasions to distinguish between permissible and imper-
missible forms of state regulation of natural gas. Moreover, the
same federal constitutional law issues may arise in the analogous
context of state regulation of oil production' 3-where the potential
is even greater for courts to create disastrous economic effects
through holdings premised on misunderstandings of the operation
of the market for oil and gas. 14
The purpose of this Article is to assist agencies and courts in
distinguishing among various types of state regulation of natural
gas. Part I briefly describes the present state of the natural gas mar-
ket. The lengthy transition from pervasive federal regulation to
complete reliance on market forces is creating severe dislocations
and inequities for many owners of natural gas. Part II of the Article
summarizes the justifications for state regulation of oil and gas pro-
duction. Imperfections in the right to own oil and gas in under-
ground reservoirs make some form of state regulation essential to
the efficient operation of oil and gas markets. Part III describes the
alternative approaches to conservation regulation used by state
agencies-unitization of common sources of supply and direct regu-
lation of producer conduct. While unitization is vastly superior to
direct regulation, it is not practicable in all situations, and it leaves
unresolved problems unique to gas marketing.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the effect of four common forms of
direct state regulation of natural gas: (1) regulations requiring pur-
chasers to take ratably from common sources of supply; (2) regula-
11 See infra text accompanying notes 41-78.
12 See infra text accompanying notes 79-150.
13 Congress determined in 1976 that market forces rather than government regula-
tion should determine the price of oil. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7 6 0g (1982). President Reagan completed implementation of that congressional pol-
icy in 1981. Exec. Order No. 12,287, 3 C.F.R. 124 (1981). That congressional policy
also preempts state actions that interfere with the operation of market forces in the oil
industry.
14 Many forms of state regulation of production are more important to the goal of
oil conservation than to the goal of gas conservation. See S. McDONALD, PETROLEUM
CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIc ANALYSIS 28, 47, 49 (1971).
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tions providing owners of gas an opportunity to sell under contracts
applicable only to other owners of gas from- a common source of
supply; (3) regulations requiring pipelines to purchase supplies in
accordance with state-prescribed priorities; and, (4) regulations lim-
iting the quantity of gas that can be produced by owners of gas.
Producing states are engaged in all four of these forms of regula-
tion, and challenges to the constitutionality of each are now pending
in state and federal courts.' 5
I
PRESENT GAS MARKET CONDITIONS
Most natural gas is sold under long-term contracts. 16 Typically,
a producer dedicates a specific gas supply exclusively to the per-
formance of the contract, and the parties agree on a mechanism for
determining the present and future price of gas sold under the con-
tract, as well as a minimum quantity of gas the purchaser is required
to "take or pay" for throughout the term of the contract. The price
and quantity provisions of gas purchase contracts vary greatly today
depending on the market and regulatory conditions that existed, or
were expected to exist, at the time the parties entered into the
contract.
Many contracts entered into in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s
provide for low fixed prices and impose on the purchaser no obliga-
tion to purchase any particular quantity of gas. These contracts
arose when the gas market was poorly developed and when many
pipelines had considerable monopsony power in important produc-
ing areas. 17
In 1954, the federal government began regulating the price of
all producer sales of gas for resale in interstate commerce under the
Natural Gas Act (NGA). 18 The price terms of the contracts entered
into for such "jurisdictional sales" from 1954 to 1978 reflect the
regulatory rules applicable to different categories of gas supplies at
15 See Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1002
(1986) (vacating and remanding for further consideration the Kansas change in method
of regulating allowable production); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil
& Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409 (holding ratable take order unconstitutional) (1986); ANR
Pipeline Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 643 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Okla. 1986) (holding
priority-of-purchase regulation unconstitutional); Seal v. Corporation Comm'n, 725
P.2d 278 (Okla. 1986) (upholding constitutionality of share-the-contract regulation).
16 See Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63, 77-
82 (1981).
17 See S. BREYER & P. MAcAVoY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COM-
MISSION 62 (1974).
18 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1982); see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672
(1954) (holding independent gas producer subject to jurisdiction of, and regulation by.
Federal Power Commission).
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the time. Generally, gas supplies produced from wells drilled prior
to 1973 are sold at an artificially low price ceiling established by the
Federal Power Commission, e.g., $0.50 per MMBtu. t 9 Gas pro-
duced from wells drilled after 1973 is subject to considerably more
generous federal price ceilings, e.g., $2.00 per MMBtu. 20 Further-
more, as the market for gas developed and as pipelines gradually
lost their monopsony power, "take or pay" clauses became more
common and competition forced the pipelines to make commit-
ments to purchase or pay for specific quantities of gas, e.g., seventy-
five percent of deliverability from the reserves dedicated in the
contract.2 1
Federal regulation of gas producer prices at artificially low
levels created a catastrophic shortage of natural gas in the 1970s. 22
Congress reacted in 1978 by enacting the NGPA. That statute cre-
ated much higher price ceilings applicable to certain types of gas
supplies, e.g., "new natural gas" and "high cost gas." 23 The price
ceilings increased automatically until, at specified times between
1979 and 1987, price ceilings ceased altogether for a large portion
of the nation's gas supply.24 Many pipelines overreacted to the gas
shortage of the 1970s and to the new opportunities to purchase gas
made available under NGPA's provisions for higher prices. They
committed themselves to pay present and future prices well above
the market-clearing level and also to take or pay for a large portion
of the gas supply dedicated under each contract, e.g., eighty-five
percent of the quantity deliverable from dedicated reserves. Thus,
the contracts of the late 1970s and early 1980s typically provided for
very high prices, e.g., $3.00 to $9.00 per MMBtu, and for commit-
ments to purchase large quantities of gas.25
The overreaction of the pipelines during the late 1970s and
early 1980s in turn created significant marketing problems for most
pipelines.26 They had committed themselves to purchase more gas
at high prices than they were able to resell at the profit margin the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) permitted. Most
19 R. PIERCE, NATURAL GAS REGULATION HANDBOOK 38 (1980).
20 Id. at 38, 59.
21 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, OFfICE OF OIL AND GAS, U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF ENERGY, NATURAL GAS PRODUCER/PURCHASER CONTRACTS AND THEIR POTENTIAL
IMPACTS ON THE NATURAL GAS MARKET 39-40 (1982).
22 See Pierce, supra note 16, at 69.
23 Pierce, The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978-Chage, Complexity, and a Major New Role
for the KCC, 47J. KAN. B.A. 259, 264 (1978) (table of classification for pricing purposes).
24 See Pierce, supra note 6, at 348-49.
25 Id. at 351.
26 See generally S. WILLIAMS, THE NATURAL GAS REVOLUTION OF 1985, at 3-14 (1985);
Griggs. Restructuring The Natural Gas Industry: Order No. 436 and Other Regulatory hzitiatives,
7 ENERGY LJ. 71, 82-84 (1986).
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pipelines reacted to this situation by substantially reducing
purchases under contracts that did not obligate them to purchase a
specified quantity of gas and by reducing substantially the price at
which they offered to purchase newly available gas supplies.
This trend created problems for many gas producers. Most pro-
ducers have access to markets only through pipelines. If all pipelines
located in a producing area have preexisting contractual commit-
ments to purchase more gas than they can sell-as has been the case
in many areas since 1983-many producers have no alternative mar-
ket for their gas. In 1985, the FERC issued Order 436 in response
to this problem of restricted producer access to markets (and re-
stricted consumer access to these other sources of supply). 27 Order
436 gives all pipelines the option of becoming "equal access carri-
ers," by agreeing to transport gas for third parties on a nondiscrimi-
natory basis, or of declining to transport gas for any third party.
Ultimately, Order 436 should solve the market access problem and
eliminate any local monopsony problems that exist in some gas
fields. 28 Its immediate effect, however, has been to exacerbate the
access problem because many pipelines have declined to transport
gas for third parties in order to avoid becoming equal access
carriers.
This chronology helps to explain the shifting context in which
producing states are attempting to regulate gas production and
purchasing both to further the conservation of oil and gas and to
protect correlative rights.
II
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR STATE REGULATION OF
OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION
Under the common law,, a landowner owns the oil and gas lo-
cated beneath the surface of her land.29 Soon after the discovery of
oil and gas, however, courts realized that enforcement of property
rights in oil and gas contained in underground reservoirs presented
unusual problems. Oil and gas can migrate easily beneath the
earth's surface once production from a reservoir begins. Thus,
whenever surface acreage owned by two or more parties overlays a
reservoir, the theoretical ownership of the oil and gas in the reser-
voir is susceptible to constant changes when one or more of the
27 Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed.
Reg. 42,408 (Oct. 18, 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nora. Associated Gas Distribs.
v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
28 See S. WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 46.
29 Del Monte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & Milling Co., 171 U.S.
55 (1898); see E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 2.4 (1962).
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owners produces oil or gas from the reservoir. Production by any
owner causes migration, or drainage, of oil and gas to that owner's
property from the property of all other owners. The early courts
found themselves powerless to enforce property rights through
traditional means in this circumstance; they needed more tangible
indicia of ownership to enforce a property right in oil and gas.
Forced to analogize to the law of wild animals, courts used physical
possession as the principal mark of an enforceable property right in
oil and gas. Once oil or gas was "captured" through drilling and
production, the courts would enforce title at the behest of the party
who produced the gas. 30
Most oil and gas reservoirs are owned by many parties. A single
reservoir can underlie hundreds or even thousands of square
miles.31 Moreover, the types of owners of the oil and gas in a reser-
voir often vary dramatically. A state, an indian tribe, or a large
rancher might own a large proportion of the minerals, with the bal-
ance owned in minute fractions by thousands of small farmers and
owners of residential property. The rule of capture and its imper-
fect property rights when applied to multiple owners causes a vari-
ety of problems but most fall into two broad categories-
conservation and correlative rights.
Markets induce conservation of natural resources by forcing
owners of natural resources to bear all of the social costs of produc-
tion and by allowing the owners to receive all of the benefits of pro-
duction. 32 In the case of a nonrenewable resource like oil and gas,
one significant present cost of production is the opportunity cost of
not being able to sell that oil and gas in the future.33 Thus, the
social cost of current production includes the discounted present
value of revenues from foregone future production. If an oil and gas
reservoir were owned by a single party, this social cost would appear
also as a private cost to that party, inducing the owner to conserve.
If more than one party owns the oil and gas in the reservoir, how-
ever, and each party can enforce its right of ownership only through
the process of capture, the opportunity cost of current production is
extemalized 34-it is a social cost that is not borne by any of the pri-
vate parties with the power to produce the resource. Each owner's
30 People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 277, 31 N.E. 59 (1892).
31 See Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 237 Kan. 248, 250,
699 P.2d 1002, 1007 (1985) (Hugoton field is 40 to 72 miles wide and 160 miles long),
vacated, 475 U.S. 1002 (1986);J. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS
68 (1986) (East Texas field is 125 miles long and covers 1.5 million acres).
32 See S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 71-84; Williams, Running Out: The Problem of
Exhaustible Resources, 7J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1978).
33 S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 98-99.
34 Id. at 99-105.
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natural market-based incentive to conserve oil and gas for future
production is reduced dramatically by its awareness that any unit it
conserves today is likely to be produced and sold by one of its
neighbors tomorrow-hence, the Tragedy of the Commons.
In the context of oil and gas production, the externalization of
opportunity costs to society resulting from the rule of capture yields
waste of resources in at least two ways. First, owners have an incen-
tive to engage in excessive well drilling.3 5 A single owner of a reser-
voir might conclude that 100 wells positioned properly would
maximize total recovery of hydrocarbons at least cost. If the same
reservoir were owned by a hundred parties, they would probably
drill thousands of wells, most in the wrong locations,3 6 in an effort
to maximize the quantity of oil and gas captured by each at the ex-
pense of its neighbors. These additional drilling costs are pure
waste from a societal perspective.
Second, the rule of capture leads to waste in the form of re-
duced overall recovery of oil and gas. Production of oil from a res-
ervoir requires energy from some source, frequently a gas "cap" or
gas dissolved in oil. If gas is produced too rapidly from a reservoir
containing both oil and gas, the reservoir's source of energy can be
dissipated long before all of the potentially recoverable reserves
have been produced. 37 Moreover, in some reservoirs oil cannot be
produced without simultaneously producing gas. Under the rule of
capture, a producer who cannot sell gas produced in association
with oil frequently will flare the gas, rather than bear the cost of
reinjecting it in the reservoir for future production, because gas re-
injected at some cost by one producer is likely to be produced and
sold in the future by a different producer.38
The concept of correlative rights arose because making prop-
erty rights in oil and gas contingent on capture creates significant
equity problems among owners of a common source of supply. One
owner may be able to capture a quantity of oil and gas grossly dis-
proportionate to its ownership interest in the common pool by
draining oil and gas from under its neighbors' property. All pro-
ducing states have recognized the concept of correlative rights in
response to the potential for one owner to "steal" gas from other
owners through uncompensated drainage. The doctrine of correla-
tive rights provides a legal framework in which each owner of oil
35 In the East Texas field alone, owners have drilled 13,000 unnecessary wells at an
annual cost of $50 million, stated in 1930s dollars! J. WEAVER, supra note 31, at 67.
36 Under the rule of capture, each owner has an incentive to drill wells near the
boundaries of its property to minimize drainage to other owners and maximize drainage
to its own wells.
37 S. MCDONALD, supra note 14, at 17-24.
38 Id. at 47.
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and gas in a reservoir can produce its fair share of the total oil and
gas in the reservoir, measured with reference to its proportionate
ownership of the reservoir.3 9
Conservation and correlative rights serve as independent justi-
fications for state regulation of oil and gas production, yet regula-
tion solely to advance one goal might adversely affect the other.
Thus, the regulatory task of a state or agency is made more difficult
because regulators must attempt to further both goals simultane-
ously. A legislature or agency will be extremely reluctant to impose
a regulation that furthers conservation at the expense of correlative
rights, and such a regulation is vulnerable on judicial review, proba-
bly even on constitutional grounds.40 One of the easiest ways to fur-
ther conservation, for instance, is to limit by regulation the number
of wells that can be drilled in a reservoir. Oil reservoirs frequently
are limited to one well per forty acres, and gas reservoirs frequently
are limited to one well per 640 acres. If, however, the drilling
unit-e.g., the forty or 640 acre block-is owned by twenty different
parties, and only one of those parties is permitted to drill a well, the
combined effect of the rule of capture and the regulatory limit on
well drilling is terribly unjust to the other nineteen owners who will
never be able to realize economic gain from their ownership inter-
ests. Without some additional state action that protects the correla-
tive rights of the nineteen owners who are prohibited from drilling,
the regulatory limit on well drilling, motivated by the state's interest
in conservation, may be a taking of private property prohibited by
the Constitution. Thus, it is important to consider the state goals of
conservation and protection of correlative rights simultaneously in
analyzing any state regulation.
III
REGULATORY METHODS OF FURTHERING THE GOALS OF
CONSERVATION AND PROTECTION OF
CORRELATIVE RIGHTS
Initially, it is useful to divide state regulation of oil and gas pro-
duction into two broad categories-unitization and direct
regulation.
A. Unitization-The Preferred Regulatory Approach
Unitization addresses directly the problems created by the com-
39 See Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 237 Kan. 248, 255,
699 P.2d 1002, 1013-14, vacated, 475 U.S. 1002 (1986); 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL
AND GAS LAW § 178 (1984).
40 Cf. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900) (state statute regulating flow of
natural gas survives constitutional attack); J. WEAVER, supra note 31, at 273.
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bination of multiple ownership of oil and gas reservoirs and the im-
perfect property right to oil and gas under the rule of capture.
Unitization functionally transforms a multiple-owner reservoir into
a single-owner reservoir. The owners agree to designate one party
as the unit operator, subject to supervision by an operating commit-
tee, and agree to share the total oil and gas production of the unit in
accordance with a formula that recognizes each owner's correlative
rights. 41
I A single example can illustrate some of the enormous advan-
tages of unitization as a means of simultaneously furthering conser-
vation and correlative rights. Assume a gas cap drive oil reservoir 42
with the gas cap located beneath fifty small farms of forty acres each,
and the balance of the reservoir located under the surrounding one
hundred square miles. Under the rule of capture, each of the fifty
farmers must drill a well in order to recover his share of the hydro-
carbons, and each must produce gas as rapidly as possible to avoid
drainage by neighbors (and to maximize drainage from neighbors).
The result would be a terrible waste. The owners will drill at least
fifty wells to produce gas that no more than four wells could pro-
duce efficiently. The energy in the gas cap would dissipate rapidly,
eliminating the producing energy for the entire reservoir, reducing
the total recoverable reserves, and increasing the cost of producing
the remaining reserves.
If the owners operated the same hypothetical reservoir on a
unitized basis, the results would differ dramatically. Because each
owner, including the fifty farmers whose land overlays the gas cap,
shares equitably in the total production from the reservoir over
time, each has an incentive to instruct the unit operator to maximize
the total value of the resource. No wells would be drilled initially in
the gas cap; an optimal number of wells would be drilled elsewhere
in the reservoir. Years later, wells would be drilled in the gas cap,
but they would not be producing wells at that stage; rather, the wells
would be used to inject gas to replenish the energy in the gas cap to
drive the reservoir. Finally, many decades after the initial develop-
ment of the reservoir, the owners would produce the gas in the cap.
Even then they would produce the gas through four wells rather
than fifty or more.
The precise changes attributable to unitization in the pattern of
the development of a reservoir vary with the characteristics of the
41 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 39, at 936-38.
42 In a gas cap drive oil reservoir a cap of natural gas lies over a portion of the oil
reservoir. The pressure of the natural gas "drives" the oil production by forcing the oil
through the wells. Thus, the very pressure of the gas cap, which may be located under
the land of only a few, is important to all producers in the field.
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reservoir. In each case, however, unitization replaces the short-
sighted wasteful patterns that exist under multiple ownership and
the rule of capture with a pattern of development carefully con-
ceived to maximize the value of oil and gas to the owners and to
society. Thus, unitization is an unmixed blessing. It benefits produ-
cers, consumers, and society.43
Unfortunately, several factors limit the benefits that unitization
of a multi-owner reservoir can bring in redressing the gross distor-
tions that the rule of capture creates. The practical difficulties in
implementing complete unitization of all reservoirs and the tradi-
tional practice of excluding gas marketing from the scope of unit
operations limit the present efficacy of unitization as a means of in-
ducing conservation and protecting correlative rights.
Frequently, many thousands of parties own an oil and gas reser-
voir. The mere process of negotiating a unitization agreement ac-
ceptable to each of thousands of parties is daunting. In the early
stages of exploration and development of a reservoir, substantial
uncertainties concerning the magnitude, location, structure, and
drive of the reservoir render it nearly impossible to reach agreement
among even a substantial proportion of the parties.44 As knowledge
of the reservoir increases, some parties develop an incentive to hold
out to gain maximum benefit from structural and regulatory advan-
tages.45 Strategic behavior that is susceptible to analysis only
through sophisticated multi-party game theory is common. The ob-
stacles to complete voluntary unitization of a major reservoir like
the East Texas Field or the Hugoton Basin are enormous-indeed,
almost certainly insurmountable. Each field covers over a thousand
square miles and is owned by tens of thousands of parties.
State conservation commissions uniformly strive to induce
greater unitization. In most states (though not in Texas unfortu-
nately),46 the conservation commission has the power to order com-
pulsory unitization.47 The power to order unitization is extremely
helpful in some cases, particularly when one or a few holdouts are
blocking an equitable agreement for strategic reasons or to benefit
from structural advantages. In most states that authorize compul-
43 For detailed descriptions of the advantages of unitization, see S. MCDONALD,
supra note 14, at 201-09; J. WEAVER, supra note 31, at 20-29.
44 J. WEAVER, supra note 31, at 30.
45 S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 213-16;J. WEAVER, supra note 31, at 29, 67, 109,
313-14.
46 Texas does authorize compulsory pooling, a variation on compulsory unitization
that is limited in its geographic scope-pooling refers to the process of combining
enough separate properties to form a well-drilling unit. See J. WEAVER, supra note 3 1, at
125.
47 See 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 39, § 912.
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sory unitization, however, the agency has no power to act unless a
statutorily specified super majority of owners (usually measured by
productive acres) petition for unitization. 48 This requirement, com-
bined with the inherent difficulty of resolving all of the factual dis-
putes necessary to devise an equitable sharing of unit production,
creates significant practical limits on state agency power to impose
unitization involuntarily on owners.
Conservation commissions use many other regulatory tech-
niques to pressure owners to form units. Orders that prohibit flar-
ing of gas,49 that reduce the level of allowable production from
some wells, 50 or that increase the allowable level from other wells5'
often force previously reluctant owners to enter negotiations to
form a unit. Even when state agencies stretch the limits of their stat-
utory power to coerce unitization, however, they fall well short of
total success. Texas produces only forty-eight percent of its total oil
from unitized operations, Louisiana sixty-four percent, and
Oklahoma thirty-nine percent.52 Even these figures overstate the
extent of state agencies' success in pursuing unitization. Most units
cover an area substantially less than a complete field; unitization
usually does not occur until fifteen to twenty years after field discov-
ery; and, the negotiations leading to unitization require an average
of almost six years. 53
B. Direct Regulation of Production-
A Second-Best Alternative
To the extent that state agencies fall short of field-wide unitiza-
tion of all reservoirs, the imperfect property rights in oil and gas
threaten to distort the oil and gas markets, to induce substantial
waste in the process of drilling and producing, and to permit owners
to drain oil and gas from the property of their neighbors. State con-
servation commissions have established extremely complicated sys-
tems of direct regulation to counteract these destructive tendencies.
The principal elements of a typical system of direct regulation are:
prohibitions on flaring of gas; maximum limits on gas/oil produc-
tion ratios; well spacing rules; and allowables, which are limits on
the quantity of oil or gas that can be produced from a well.
Although many people believe that no-flare orders further con-
servation by prohibiting wasteful use of a valuable resource, the
48 Id. § 913.5.
49 S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 23-24, 46-47, 123-24; J. WEAVER, supra note 31,
at 143-48.
50 J. WEAVER, supra note 31, at 148-51.
51 Id. at 151-54.
52 Id. at 315-16.
53 Id. at 318-19.
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only true benefit in most cases is to induce unitization. 54 Indeed,
flaring sometimes is the use of natural gas that most benefits society,
and a no-flare order in such circumstances is itself wasteful.55 Maxi-
mum limits on gas/oil production ratios serve the critical function of
avoiding dissipation of energy in dissolved gas and gas cap drive
reservoirs. 56 Well spacing rules directly reduce some of the exces-
sive drilling that otherwise results from the rule of capture. 57
The core of most conservation programs, and the most compli-
cated element, is the system of allowables limiting the amount of oil
and gas that can be produced from any particular well, lease, or
unit. 58 At any given time, a particular allowable or set of allowables
performs one or more of the following four functions, depending on
the specific circumstances to which they are applied and the manner
in which they are calculated. First, allowables can induce unitization
if they are set at levels of production that counteract structural ad-
vantages that motivate some owners to block efforts at unitization. 59
Second, allowables can protect a reservoir from structural damage
when based on a well's maximum efficient rate of recovery. 60 Third,
allowables can indirectly discourage excessive drilling when based
on the number of acres allocated to a well because they prevent
owners from increasing their revenues by drilling additional wells at
their neighbors' expense. 61 Finally, reserve-based allowables can
help to protect correlative rights; if the allowable is calculated cor-
rectly and if each well produces its allowable each day, the drainage
problem is lessened.6 2
All students of state conservation regulation agree that unitiza-
tion is vastly superior to direct regulation. 65 Direct regulation fur-
thers the states' dual goals of conservation and protection of
correlative rights only in a crude manner, often with severely distor-
tive side effects. 64 Even the most harsh critics of direct regulation
recognize, however, that it yields significantly better results than the
results of an unregulated market with property rights in oil and gas
54 S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 23-24, 46-47, 123-24;J. WEAVER, supra note 31,
at 142-48.
55 S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 204, 235.
56 Id. at 46.
57 Id. at 182-83.
58 Id at 150-51.
59 J. WEAVER, supra note 31, at 316-19.
60 S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 47; Martin, The Establishment of Allowables for Pro-
duction of Gas in Louisiana, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 267, 268 (1986).
61 S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 150-51.
62 Id. at 649; Martin, supra note 60, at 269.
63 See S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 197-226;J. WEAVER, supra note 31, at 20-29.
64 S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 183-96.
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contingent upon "capture" through production. 65
For several decades, the allowables system had another impor-
tant effect as well; it provided a means through which Texas, Louisi-
ana, and Oklahoma could assert their market power over oil and gas
to increase prices, at least in the short term, above marginal cost.66
Because these states had market power in the domestic market and
protection from international competition through import quotas, 6 7
their cooperative action to reduce the quantity and increase the
price of oil and gas produced enhanced the wealth of producers and
of producing states at the expense of consumers and consuming
states. By the 1960s, however, these three states had lost their mar-
ket power, and it is unlikely that any combination of producing
states in the United States will obtain significant market power in
the future.6 8 Thus, while producing states can still reduce the quan-
tity of oil and gas produced and thereby increase to some extent the
price of oil and gas through their allowables decisions, the states
and their producers would lose wealth as a result of such decisions.
C. The Need to Supplement Unitization in the Gas Marketing
Context
Field-wide unitization can eliminate the need for any direct reg-
ulation of production to achieve conservation goals. Even if a field
is unitized, however, state agencies frequently encounter serious dif-
ficulties in protecting correlative rights to natural gas because the
marketing of the natural gas produced by a unitized field has tradi-
tionally been left to the individual owner. The traditional form of
operating agreement for a unitized set of properties gives the unit
operator control over all significant development and production
decisions. It leaves to the individual owners, however, virtually all
power and responsibility to market their share of unit production.
Antitrust concerns and a fear that the unit might be taxed as a cor-
poration if marketing control were given to the operator underlie
the decision to keep marketing decentralized. 69
Reserving to each of the many owners the right to market pro-
duction rarely creates problems in the context of oil.70 The oil mar-
ket primarily operates on a posted price system-various purchasers
65 Id. at 129, 182-83;J. WEAVER, supra note 31, at 347-49.
66 S. MCDONALD, supra note 14, at 188-96; J. WEAVER, supra note 3 1, at 75, 98-99.
67 J. WEAVER, supra note 31, at 61.
68 See McLure, Economic Constraints on State and Local Taxation of Energy Resources, 31
NAT'L TAxJ. 257, 259-60 (1978) (noting the impact on the market of OPEC as well as
Gulf Coast and lower Atlantic states).
69 S. MCDONALD, supra note 14, at 201, 245, 250; 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 39, at § 911.
70 Martin, supra note 60, at 270.
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announce daily the price they are willing to pay, and all available oil
is purchased at that price. Changes in quantity available or de-
manded are reflected almost immediately in changes in the purchase
price, allowing the market to "clear" on a daily basis.
The natural gas market, unlike the oil market, is dominated by
long-term contracts. The many changes in market and regulatory
conditions that have taken place from 1940 through 1987 have
shaped the existing pattern of contracts. 7' The contract price and
quantity provisions that govern gas produced from a common
source of supply-even from a single well-can differ enormously.
Three hypotheticals, typical of today's market conditions, help to
illustrate the severe problems state conservation commissions now
confront in protecting correlative rights to natural gas.
In the first hypothetical, assume that producer X is the operator
of a single well unit in which X has a fifty percent ownership inter-
est, with the other fifty percent owned in widely varying proportions
by forty other parties. Producer Y, one of the other owners, has a
one percent interest in the gas in the single well unit. Producer X
negotiated a long-term contract with a pipeline in 1981, when some
pipelines believed that they would confront a shortage unless they
purchased aggressively. Producer X's contract now calls for a price
of $7.00 per MMBtu and commits the pipeline to purchase eighty-
five percent of the maximum quantity of X's gas available for deliv-
ery from the well. Producer Y did not obtain a contract in 1981, but
the pipeline purchasing from X also bought Y's gas proportionately
at the price set forth in X's contract throughout 1982. In 1983,
however, the pipeline discovered that it was contractually obligated
to purchase more gas than it could sell at an acceptable profit mar-
gin, so it ceased purchases of all gas it was not contractually commit-
ted to purchase. Producer Y discovers that other prospective
purchasers are in a similar situation and has great difficulty finding
anyone willing to purchase its gas supply on acceptable terms. Pro-
ducer X is producing and draining producer Y's gas from the single
well unit. Producer Y complains to the conservation commission
that its correlative rights are being violated.
In the second hypothetical, assume that neighboring producers
A and B each have contracts for the life of reserves negotiated with
pipelines during the 1950s. The pricing provisions of the two con-
tracts are identical, but producer A's contract alone includes a pro-
vision requiring the pipeline to take or pay for the allowable level of
production from the well determined by the state conservation com-
mission. Both pipelines are experiencing difficulty selling at an ac-
71 See supra text accompanying notes 16-28.
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ceptable profit margin all the gas they are obligated by contract to
purchase. The pipeline purchasing from producer A will reduce its
purchases from A to the minimum permitted by contract-the al-
lowable set by the state commission. The pipeline purchasing from
B also will reduce its purchases from B to the minimum permitted
by contract-at or near zero. As a result, A's production will drain
gas from B's property. B complains to the conservation commission
that its correlative rights are being violated.
In the third hypothetical, Z produces both oil and gas from the
same reservoir. Several gas pipelines have facilities near Z's wells,
but no pipeline is contractually obligated to purchase all of the gas Z
produces. Because of the gas surplus, Z is unable to obtain a gas
purchase contract that will permit it to sell all of its associated gas
on terms it considers acceptable. If producer Z wants to produce oil
from the reservoir it also must produce associated gas. Without an
available purchaser of all that gas, however, Z must flare some of the
gas it produces in violation of the conservation commission's policy
prohibiting flaring as a wasteful act. Producer Z complains to the
commission that pipeline purchasing practices are forcing it either
to refrain from producing oil otherwise available for the market or
to engage in wasteful flaring of gas.
IV
ANALYSIS OF FOUR TYPES OF STATE REGULATION
The three examples given above closely resemble the actual
patterns that have given rise to the four types of state regulatory
actions that are presently facing constitutional challenges. The first
hypothetical is a simplified version of the facts in Transco.72 The
Mississippi Oil & Gas Board responded to the complaints of pro-
ducer B-the small percentage owner with no "take or pay" con-
tract provision-by ordering the pipeline purchaser to comply with
a previously unenforced state statute that required any purchaser of
gas to take ratably from a common source of supply, i.e., the Board
ordered Transco to purchase gas from B in proportion to B's own-
ership of the single well unit from which Transco was purchasing
gas from A pursuant to its contract with A. The Supreme Court's
five-to-four decision in Transco held that order unconstitutional.
The first hypothetical also illustrates the factual predicate for
regulatory actions taken in Oklahoma by statute73 and in Louisiana
by order of the Commissioner of Conservation.74 Both states com-
72 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409
(1986) (5-4 decision).
73 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 541-547 (Supp. 1987).
74 See Martin, supra note 60, at 284-286.
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pelled producers in A's situation to provide producers like B an op-
tion to sell gas under A's contract. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
recently upheld the constitutionality of the Oklahoma statute in Seal
v. Corporation Commission.75 The Louisiana orders are the subject of
ongoing litigation in state courts. 76
The second hypothetical-in which only one of two neighbor-
ing producers has a "take or pay" contract-represents a simplified
version of the factual pattern that led the Kansas Corporation Com-
mission to modify its allowable rules for the enormous Hugoton Ba-
sin Field.77 That rule change was designed to pressure certain
purchasers to increase their quantities of gas purchased to avoid the
continuing and increasing drainage to some producers from the
property of others. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the com-
mission's order, with one justice dissenting on the basis that the or-
der was unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court
granted a petition for writ of certiorari before it had decided Transco,
and then remanded the case to the Kansas Supreme Court for re-
consideration of its prior decision in light of Transco.78
The third hypothetical-where Z produces both oil and gas
from the same well but has no purchase contract, and can find no
buyer, for its gas output-illustrates the factual predicate for the pri-
ority-of-purchase rules that several conservation commissions have
promulgated. 79 These rules purport to compel pipelines to
purchase certain types of gas supplies in the state before other types
of supplies. Gas produced in association with oil is given a high
priority to avoid, or at least to minimize, wasteful flaring of such gas.
In 1986, a federal district court held Oklahoma's priority-of-
purchase statute unconstitutional in ANR Pipeline Corp. v. Corporation
Commission.80 An appeal to the Tenth Circuit is now pending.
A. Ratable Take Regulations
The simplified facts of the first hypothetical permit easy isola-
75 725 P.2d 278 (Okla. 1986).
76 See Martin, supra note 60, at 287.
77 See Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 237 Kan. 248, 699
P.2d 1002 (1985), vacated, 475 U.S. 1002 (1986).
78 Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1002 (1986).
The Kansas Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed its prior holding in Northwest
Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 240 Kan. 638, 732 P.2d 775 (1987),petition
for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3809 (U.S. May 21, 1987)(No. 86-1856).
79 See, e.g., TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 3.34(f) (1986). Most producing states have
similar rules. See Barlow, Enter: Open Access and Abandonment-Exit: State Prorationing and
Ratable Take, ATRA NATuRAL-GAS INSIGHTS, July 1986, at 1, 4.
80 643 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Okla. 1986). Curiously, while the court held the entire
regulation unconstitutional, it discussed only the last priority, which merely imposed a
ratable take obligation with respect to gas well gas.
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tion of the issues in Transco. Based on a state statute that required
any purchaser to take ratably from all owners in a common supply
source, the Mississippi Board ordered Transco to take gas ratably
from B, even though Transco had a contractual obligation to take
only from A. The most curious aspect of the case was the treatment
of the price issue at each stage of decision-making.
As the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized, the core of the
dispute was the price at which Transco would purchase from B.81
Yet, the Board's order had made only an oblique reference to price,
and the supreme court's own treatment of the price issue also was
obscure. In an obvious effort to reconcile the Board's order with
federal law, the Mississippi court held that the legislature had not
granted the board the power to determine the price at which a pur-
chaser must take ratably from a noncontract owner of a common
source of supply.8 2 If the court had stopped at this point, the case
would have become moot as a practical matter because ratable take
orders with no price provision can neither conflict with a federal
goal nor further the state's goal of protecting correlative rights.
Any purchaser would be pleased to take ratably at some price, e.g.,
$0.01, $0.10, or perhaps even $1.00 per MMBtu. Indeed, Transco
had offered to purchase B's gas, but B understandably had rejected
the offer as unacceptable;8 3 such an offer might not have even cov-
ered B's variable costs of production. A ratable take order with no
price limitation is a practical nullity. The order can further a state
goal only if it compels the purchaser to pay a price in excess of the
price it is otherwise willing to pay.
The Mississippi Supreme Court did not conclude its discussion
of price with its holding that the Board had no power over price,
however. It went on to say that the purchaser must make an "offer
in good faith [on] reasonable terms."8 4 It is impossible to know pre-
cisely what the court meant by this, but it must reflect the court's
belief that some Mississippi institution has some power to deter-
mine the minimum price at which a ratable take must be made. For
purposes of analyzing the constitutional issues addressed by the
United States Supreme Court I will assume, as the Supreme Court
apparently assumed, that Mississippi intended to compel Transco's
ratable takes at a price in excess of the price offered by any prospec-
tive purchaser. Without such an assumption, the controversy before
the Court would disappear.
81 Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 457 So. 2d 1298,
1328 (Miss. 1984), rev'd, 474 U.S. 409 (1986).
82 Id. at 1329-30.
83 Id. at 1309.
84 Id. at 1331.
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Justice Blackmun's opinion for the five-Justice majority is rela-
tively easy to summarize. "Mississippi's action directly undermines
Congress' determination that the supply, the demand, and the price
of high-cost gas be determined by market forces" because it would
increase prices to consumers.8 5
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the four dissenting Justices re-
lies upon somewhat more complicated reasoning. The dissent
agrees with the majority that Congress's purpose in enacting the
NGPA was to eliminate regulatory constraints on the wellhead price
of gas, and that any state action inconsistent with that goal is pre-
empted.8 6 The dissent concludes, however, that a ratable take rule
is entirely consistent with Congress's purpose.8 7 The reasoning to
support this conclusion starts with the statement of a vitally impor-
tant principle that should guide courts in this area of the law: "State
regulation that merely defines property rights or establishes con-
tractual rules, however, does not interfere with this purpose. Mar-
kets depend upon such rules to function efficiently. ' 88
After this strong beginning, however, the dissent's effort to ap-
ply this important principle flounders in a sea of misunderstanding
with respect to the effects of different forms of state regulation of
gas production. The dissent sees the ratable take rule as merely a
rule of contract law.89 It analogizes the ratable take rule to compul-
sory unitization in its effects on conservation and correlative
rights,90 characterizing the impact of a ratable take rule on price as
"neutral," "attenuated," and "a mere drop in the bucket." 9' More-
over, the dissent opines that Transco brought on itself any problems
created by the ratable take rule when it entered into a take-or-pay
contract with one of several owners of a common pool.92 Presuma-
bly, any gas purchaser could avoid all similar problems in the future
(and could have done so in the past) simply by refraining from en-
tering into any contract unless it was prepared to buy from all own-
ers in a common pool on the same terms.
The easiest way to test the dissent's conclusions is to assume
that the dissent had prevailed and states could apply ratable take
rules. At the time the case was decided, Transco, like most gas pipe-
lines, was committed by contract to purchase more gas than it could
85 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 422
(1986).
86 Id. at 432-33.
87 Id. at 429.
88 Id. at 433.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 433-34, 436.
92 Id. at 435.
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resell at a price that would permit it to earn the rate of return that
the FERC authorized. This was a situation of Transco's own mak-
ing, and state and federal courts are, quite properly, forcing pipe-
lines to honor their contractual commitments even though the
pipelines suffer financially. 93
Mississippi, however, would have compelled Transco to
purchase not only the gas it had contracted to buy from Mississippi
producers, but also all gas not under contract (and perhaps all gas
subject to contracts with less favorable take-or-pay terms) if that gas
was in a common pool with any gas Transco had contracted to
purchase. This is not simply a rule of contract law; it is a substantial
regulatory expansion of contractual obligations. Moreover, if Mis-
sissippi could impose such an obligation, all other states in which
Transco has contracts to purchase gas would follow suit.94
Transco, like all major pipelines, has take-or-pay contracts with
owners in hundreds of different reservoirs. In most cases, its con-
tracts are with only a small fraction of the owners of the reservoir.
In many cases, the common pool covers hundreds of square miles.
The owners of the common pool-who typically number in the
scores, hundreds or even thousands-are in widely disparate con-
tractual situations. Some have extremely favorable contracts, simi-
lar to A's contract with Transco, but with other pipelines. Many
have less favorable contracts with other pipelines. Many others are
in B's position: they have no contract because of the existence of a
significant surplus of deliverable gas. Moreover, the population of
producers without contracts changes constantly as old contracts ex-
pire or become subject to renegotiation, and as owners drill new
wells.
Presumably, because Transco entered into a take-or-pay con-
tract, for instance, with each of one hundred owners in one hundred
common pools obligating it to purchase a specified aggregate quan-
tity of gas per year, each state could compel Transco to purchase on
a proportionate basis all gas not under contract in each of those one
hundred pools. Given the present gas deliverability surplus, there
undoubtedly are hundreds of owners without contracts in each of
the hundred pools from which Transco has contracted to purchase
gas. The aggregate deliverability from the uncontracted portion of
those pools undoubtedly exceeds the total volume Transco has
committed to purchase. The uncontracted portion of any pool also
93 E.g., PGC Pipeline v. Louisiana Intrastate Gas, 791 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1986);
Challenger Minerals, Inc. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., No. 84-C-357-E (N.D. Okla. Sep.
9, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
94 The Mississippi Supreme Court explicitly recognized this fact. 457 So. 2d at
1321-22.
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is subject to potential expansion on a regular basis as contracts ex-
pire or become subject to renegotiation, and as new wells are
drilled. Thus, state ratable take regulation could force Transco to
purchase additional gas supplies several times the total volume it
has contractually committed to purchase at a time when it cannot
sell even the gas it has committed to purchase.
If Transco could not recover in its rates the cost of the stagger-
ing new obligations that the producing states would impose, it
would collapse under this overwhelming new regulatory burden
within a matter of months. The same would be true of any other gas
purchaser-pipeline, consumer, or distributor. The dissent's char-
acterization of the price impact of ratable take rules as "neutral"
must have been premised on a serious misunderstanding of the con-
textual facts. The dissent refers to the gas potentially at stake as "a
mere drop in the bucket" because the Mississippi order applied only
to federally deregulated gas. 95 That category now encompasses
over fifty percent of the total gas supply, however, and includes a
much higher proportion of the gas that is not the subject of gas
purchase contracts. Eventually, all gas supplies will be deregulated
under the NGPA.96
Another helpful way of analyzing the effect of a ratable take rule
is to contrast the present operation of the gas market with the man-
ner in which the market would function with an enforceable ratable
take rule. The gas deliverability surplus forces producers without
contracts to accept lower prices for newly available gas supplies, and
to accept lower prices when contracts expire or become subject to
renegotiation. This in turn increases the quantity of gas demanded
and reduces exploration and production activity, thereby reducing
over time the quantity of gas supplied and resulting in market equi-
librium-precisely the results a market is supposed to achieve.
With enforceable ratable take rules, however, we would see to-
tally different actions in response to the present surplus. If any one
of the many owners of a common pool had a contract, every other
owner of that pool would have a regulatory right to sell its gas to the
same purchaser at whatever price and other terms the producing
state considered "reasonable." By definition, that price would be
above a market-determined price, or else the ratable take rule would
have no effect at all. No producer would accept a lower price for a
new gas supply during the renegotiation of an existing contract or
95 The dissent cited an article that stated that less than 1%o of the nation's gas sup-
ply was deregulated in 1982 when the article was written. Transco, 474 U.S. at 436 (cit-
ing Pierce, supra note 16, at 88 n.98). The same article states, however, that over one-
half the nation's gas supply would be deregulated by 1985. Pierce, supra note 16, at 89.
96 Pierce, supra note 16, at 89.
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upon the expiration of a contract. The price of gas would thus re-
main above the market-clearing level, and the quantity demanded
would not increase. The rate of well drilling in the field would in-
crease because of the state-guaranteed out-of-state market for all
new gas produced from the common pool. Quantity supplied would
increase rather than decrease, and the deliverability surplus would
grow rather than shrink.
Market equilibrium would never be achieved with ratable take
rules in effect for the simple reason that states could block the most
fundamental operation of market forces. In the context of Transco,
for instance, Mississippi would have compelled citizens of New
York, New Jersey, Virginia, and North Carolina to purchase Missis-
sippi's natural resources on whatever terms Mississippi considered
reasonable. Louisiana, Texas, and Oklahoma would not be far be-
hind in shifting by regulation the economic burden of the gas sur-
plus to other states as well.
The dissent was correct, of course, when it said that Transco
could have avoided any potential adverse impact of a ratable take
rule by declining to enter into any take-or-pay contract with any
owner of a common pool or by entering into identical contracts with
all such owners. 97 It is worth considering the implications of that
statement, however. The statement does not apply to previously
discovered fields, of course, because at least one owner in each such
field undoubtedly has a contract for sale at any given point of time.
Assume, however, that a major new field is discovered. Typically,
the field will be owned by hundreds or thousands of individuals. In
addition, the field will probably not be unitized for at least fifteen to
twenty years after it is capable of production, and there is a better
than fifty percent probability that the field never will be fully unit-
ized.98 Even if it is unitized, the owners are likely to leave marketing
to the sole control of the individual owners because of antitrust and
tax considerations. 99 Transco, and all other prospective purchasers,
would have to choose between declining to contract with any of the
owners of the new field or attempting to contract simultaneously
with all owners on the same terms. Such a system would be totally
unworkable. It would not perfect a gas market; rather, it would
eliminate most transactions in natural gas.
The goal that underlies ratable take rules-protection of correl-
ative rights-deserves recognition and respect by federal agencies
and courts. Courts should allow states to pursue that goal as an
exercise of the state's police power, even if those state actions have
97 474 U.S. at 435.
98 J. WEAVER, supra note 31, at 316-18.
99 S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 201, 245, 250.
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some incidental adverse effect on the attainment of federal goals.
Yet state action in the form of ratable take orders-even if aimed at
protecting correlative rights-so completely undercuts the NGPA's
goal of deregulating natural gas that no court could permit the or-
ders to stand.
Neither opinion in Transco indicates that the Justices have a suf-
ficient understanding of gas production and marketing to permit
them to analyze correctly the constitutionality of the many other
forms of state regulation of gas that will soon come before the
Court. The dissent recognized the proper analytical framework for
analysis of such issues-that some forms of state regulation actually
improve the operation of the market by addressing imperfections in
property rights. The dissenting Justices did not understand the
complicated factual context in which gas is produced and marketed,
however. With one more vote in a future case, the dissenting Jus-
tices in Transco could affirm other types of state regulation that
would greatly impair the federal goal of establishing an effective
market for natural gas.
Although the five-Justice majority reached the right result in
Transco, its reasoning does not appear to reflect a recognition of the
important pro-market purposes that underlie many forms of state
conservation regulation. The majority's reasoning could cause the
invalidation of any state regulation that affects gas price, supply, or
demand. Yet all forms of state conservation regulation will have this
effect, and courts should tolerate, indeed strongly encourage, many
types of state regulatory actions as a means of counteracting the ad-
verse effect of imperfections in property rights. Compulsory uni-
tization is the classic example of a pro-market state regulation of oil
and gas that affects the price of those commodities by forcing own-
ers to internalize what otherwise would be the external social cost of
waste in the form of excessive drilling and premature production
and by permitting owners to internalize the social benefits of
production.1 00
2. Share-the-Contract Statutes
All producing states are concerned about the correlative rights
problem that gave rise to the Mississippi action challenged in
Transco. Most states have attempted to address that problem by
means other than ratable take laws; these states anticipated a hold-
ing that ratable take laws are unconstitutional. 10 ' The 1983
100 See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
101 The Court's decision in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372
U.S. 84 (1963) foreshadowed such a holding. See also Meyers, Federal Preemption and State
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Oklahoma statute, 0 2 upheld against constitutional attack by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in 1986,103 illustrates one of the alterna-
tive methods of addressing correlative rights problems.
The Oklahoma statute requires the operator of each well to
provide each owner of the drilling unit the option to elect to have
the operator market each owner's share of the gas on terms at least
as favorable as those the operator obtained for its own share. Any
owner can decline the election in advance or can rescind the elec-
tion if the operator does not enter into a contract for sale within 120
days. Electing owners become, in effect, co-owners for gas market-
ing purposes. If any electing owner obtains a gas purchase contract
applicable to any portion of the gas produced from the well, the
proceeds from that contract must be shared by all electing owners in
proportion to their ownership of the drilling unit.
Superficially, the Oklahoma statute seems analogous to the Mis-
sissippi ratable take order held unconstitutional in Transco. Both
have the effect of compelling a pipeline purchaser to buy gas from
uncontracted co-owners of a common pool. The resemblance be-
tween the two forms of regulation is purely superficial, however.
While the Mississippi order had the effect of substantially increasing
the obligations of any pipeline with a contract to purchase gas from
a common pool, the Oklahoma statute explicitly disavows any intent
to expand the obligations of purchasers beyond those they volunta-
rily assumed by contract.
A simple example illustrates the widely disparate effects of rata-
ble take orders and statutory co-ownership options. Assume that
producer A owns fifty percent of a drilling unit, with the other fifty
percent spread unevenly among fifty other owners. Producer A self-
ishly and successfully markets only its own gas, leaving the smaller
interest owners poorly situated to locate a buyer who is willing to
offer terms as favorable as those in A's contract for the modest
volumes they have available. Assume that A's contract obligates the
pipeline to take or pay for eighty percent of the volumes deliverable
from A's interest in the drilling unit; the total deliverability from the
well is 1000 MMBtu per day. Thus, the pipeline purchaser has
agreed to take or pay for 400 MMBtu per day from the well.
The Mississippi ratable take order would expand, by state regu-
latory action, the pipeline's purchase obligation from the level of
400 MMBtu it committed to purchase by contract to 800 MMBtu.
Of course, the ratable take order could increase the pipeline's obli-
Conservation in Northern Natural Gas, 77 HARV. L. REV. 689 (1964); Note, Conservation of
Natural Gas and the Federal-State Conflict, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 888 (1964).
102 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 541-47 (Supp. 1987).
103 Seal v. State Corp. Comm'n, 725 P.2d 278 (Okla. 1986).
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gations even more if it were applied to all uncontracted owners in
the "common pool" from which the well produces, defined as the
entire reservoir. As described in the prior section, the ratable take
order relieves all uncontracted owners of the burden of accepting
lower market-determined prices for their gas, thereby freezing the
price of gas above the market-clearing level.
By contrast, under the Oklahoma share-the-contract statute, the
pipeline purchaser's obligation remains at the 400 MMBtu per day
level to which it committed by contract. The only change effected by
the Oklahoma regulatory action is with respect to the ownership of
the gas purchased. Instead of being owned 100% by A, A owns fifty
percent of the gas purchased, B one percent, etc.
Like any regulation of gas production, the Oklahoma statute
has some impact on price; hence, it is potentially vulnerable to a
constitutional challenge under the one-dimensional reasoning re-
flected in the majority opinion in Transco. The regulation's effect on
price is only slight, however, and incidental to its primary purpose
of furthering the legitimate state interest in protecting correlative
rights. Share-the-contract regulations, unlike ratable take orders,
leave exactly the same proportion of aggregate gas supply that is not
subject to contract and, hence, available to permit price decreases
resulting from the operation of market forces. Only the ownership
of the uncontracted gas is changed by the regulation. In the hypo-
thetical illustration, for instance, fifty owners had no contract for
sale of any portion of their supply before the regulation was applied.
Under a share-the-contract regulation, fifty-one owners have con-
tracts that cover only part of their total deliverable supply. This
change in ownership of uncontracted gas might reduce slightly the
downward pressure of market forces on gas prices. This type of
slight and incidental effect on the market price of gas should not
suffice to invalidate a regulation that furthers a legitimate state pur-
pose, however.
Share-the-contract regulations provide a partial, but only par-
tial, response to the problem of protecting correlative rights to nat-
ural gas. They protect such rights only within a single drilling unit.
As the introductory illustrations indicate, however, widespread cor-
relative rights problems also exist among the different drilling units
in a common pool. 10 4 A single reservoir may include hundreds of
drilling units, each owned by different combinations of parties.
Drainage among units is a commonplace problem that the present
forms of share-the-contract regulations do not address at all. With
ratable take laws now constitutionally unavailable to state regula-
104 See supra text accompanying notes 71-72; infra text accompanying notes 121-31.
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tors-and properly so-most regulators have attempted to address
the shortcomings of share-the-contract regulation principally
through revisions to their allowables policy. I will return to this
method of regulation after discussing another form of state regula-
tion of gas purchasing practices.
3. Priority-of-purchase Regulations
The third hypothetical illustrates the type of situation that has
motivated many producing states to promulgate regulations that
compel pipelines to purchase all gas accessible to their pipelines or
gathering systems in accordance with state-prescribed priorities of
purchase. 10 5 For example, if a producer of both oil and gas from
the same reservoir fails to obtain an acceptable contract to purchase
all of the associated gas it produces, it must choose either to reinject
the gas, shut in the oil production, or flare the gas. If the producer
cannot economically reinject the gas into the reservoir, the producer
will choose one of the other options. Both of the other options,
however, arguably lead to the very waste that the state agencies are
charged to avoid. This is the classic justification for requiring any
pipeline accessible to a supply of associated gas to purchase all of
that gas before it purchases any gas-well gas.
The case in support of the constitutionality of state priority-of-
purchase regulations seems stronger in one respect than the case
for ratable take regulations. Federal courts have long recognized
the importance of a state's interest in conserving its natural re-
sources,' 0 6 and the relationship between conservation and a regula-
tion requiring preferential purchase of associated gas seems clear
and direct-far more so than the tenuous link between conservation
and ratable take regulations. 107 Priority-of-purchase regulations
also should be held unconstitutional under the supremacy clause
and NGPA, however. The regulations interfere directly and signifi-
cantly with the federal goal of relying upon market forces to deter-
mine the price of gas, and they are not necessary to further the
state's conservation goal. Indeed, such regulations reflect a serious,
if widespread, misunderstanding of the concept of conservation of
natural resources.
In analyzing the constitutionality of any state regulation that ar-
105 See, e.g., Okla. Corp. Comm'n Rule 1-305, held unconstitutional in ANR Pipeline Co.
v. Corporation Comm'n, 643 F. Supp. 419 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
106 See, e.g., Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
107 The principal purpose of ratable take regulations is to protect correlative rights.
They may also enhance conservation in subtle ways, however. See generally Martin, State
Regulation of Aratural Gas Production: Is There Life After Transco?, 38 INST. ON OIL & GAS L.
& TAx'N 1 (1987). Of course, protection of correlative rights is also a legitimate and
important state purpose. S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 232.
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guably interferes with the federal goal of relying on market forces, a
good starting point is to compare the results of state regulation with
the results of a properly functioning market. In the absence of state
priority-of-purchase regulations, associated gas would command a
price significantly below the price of nonassociated gas because pur-
chasers are willing to pay more for the greater flexibility that a
nonassociated gas producer can offer. If the purchaser's needs fluc-
tuate from time to time, as they always do, the purchaser places a
high value on the seller's willingness, in effect, to store gas for it
during periods of slack demand and to produce a greater volume in
periods of high demand. Within limits, a producer of nonassociated
gas is in a position to provide this storage service at a cost, and
hence a price, lower than the purchaser's cost of storing gas through
other means.
A producer of associated gas, however, must incur much higher
storage costs than a producer of nonassociated gas. It can only store
gas for a purchaser by reducing its production and sale of oil or by
reinjecting gas in the reservoir-either of which is costly to the pro-
ducer. As a result, producers of associated gas almost invariably in-
sist on gas purchase contracts that guarantee that the purchaser will
take or pay for 100% of the gas made available. This is in contrast
to the fifty to eighty percent take-or-pay provisions, accompanied by
five-year makeup periods, typically found in contracts to purchase
nonassociated gas.
This significant difference in scope of purchase commitments
means that purchasers place a lower value on associated gas then
they do on nonassociated gas.' 08 Associated gas is less valuable to
purchasers because purchasers bear all the cost of storing the gas to
accommodate fluctuations in gas demand. In addition, purchasers
of associated gas face greater costs and risks if they breach a con-
tract to purchase associated gas. Courts are likely to assess higher
damages and/or to impose costly equitable remedies on a purchaser
that has breached a contract to purchase associated gas.' 0 9
Associated gas also costs less to produce than nonassociated
gas. Indeed, it is impossible to assign a separate cost to production
of associated gas on any principled basis because oil and associated
gas are joint products. 110 In some circumstances, the marginal cost
of producing associated gas is zero because joint marginal produc-
tion cost is fully recovered through the sale of oil.
In short, the market places a lower value on associated gas, and
108 See Barlow, supra note 79, at 5.
109 See, e.g., Mitchell Energy & Dev. Corp. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., No. 18,308
(Wise Cty., Tex. Dist. Ct. Sept. 8, 1986).
110 See S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoY, supra note 17, at 67.
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associated gas typically is less costly to produce than nonassociated
gas. This accounts for all of the factors significant to market per-
formance. In a properly functioning market, associated gas would
always command a lower price than nonassociated gas. Yet, associ-
ated gas today sells for a higher price than nonassociated gas.'
Only one explanation exists for this phenomenon-state priority-of-
purchase regulations are interfering significantly with the operation
of the gas market.
Priority-of-purchase regulations increase gas prices to consum-
ers and permit producing states to enhance their wealth and the
wealth of their producer constituents at the expense of consumers
and consuming states. This effect can be isolated by considering
priority-of-purchase regulations from the perspective of a typical
pipeline that has contracted to purchase more gas at high prices
than it can resell at an acceptable margin. Without priority-of-
purchase regulation, the principal legal constraint on the pipeline's
purchasing practices is its own contractual commitments. States
properly are enforcing these pipeline contracts, even though the ef-
fect of that enforcement is to increase the price of gas 1'2-a classic
example of the type of state "regulation" that falls within the Transco
dissent's category of state regulations essential to a properly func-
tioning market.' 13
In this situation, the market will yield a significant decline in the
price offered for uncontracted associated gas. The pipeline will buy
that gas only if the producer will sell it at a low price-lower even
than the price the pipeline will pay for gas-well gas because the pro-
ducer understandably will insist that the pipeline purchase all of the
associated gas at the time it becomes available. The ultimate effect
of the low price offered for associated gas is an increase in the quan-
tity of gas demanded and a decrease in the quantity supplied-pre-
cisely the mechanism through which a market with a supply surplus
moves to equilibrium.
The priority-of-purchase regulation imposes on the pipeline a
new, potentially significant purchase obligation that, by definition,
the pipeline has not voluntarily assumed by contract and is unwilling
to assume by contract. The pipeline must purchase all available and
uncontracted associated gas accessible to its system before it
purchases any of the nonassociated gas it has committed to
purchase by contract."
The new regulatory obligation the state imposes can be quite
111 Barlow, supra note 79, at 5.
112 See supra note 93.
I 13 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 433
(1986).
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large. In Oklahoma, for instance, twenty-nine percent of total gas
deliverability is associated gas. 114 The regulatory obligation ex-
tends only to such gas that is not under contract, but that class ex-
pands constantly as new production becomes available, and as old
contracts expire or become subject to renegotiation. The regula-
tory obligation is in addition to the pipeline's contractual obligation
that the state's judiciary will enforce; the imposition of the priority-
of-purchase regulation does not provide a valid defense to an action
for breach of a pipeline's gas purchase contract for nonassociated
gas. 115
In short, the state priority-of-purchase regulation has the same
direct anti-market effect as a ratable take regulation. It provides a
state-guaranteed market, consisting of out-of-state consumers, for a
large portion of the state's gas supply at prices above those the mar-
ket otherwise would determine.
State priority-of-purchase regulations also are not essential to
serve any properly conceived conservation function. Indeed, ab-
staining from priority-of-purchase regulation would further conser-
vation. To understand this point it is necessary to delve a bit into
the economics of oil and gas production. A producer of oil and as-
sociated gas from the same reservoir has four choices: (1) shut in
the oil production; (2) reinject the gas; (3) sell the gas at whatever
price it can obtain; or, (4) flare the gas. Each option has costs and
benefits to the producer, and the producer will choose the option
that yields the greatest net benefits to it. If the reservoir is unitized,
the producer's costs and benefits function as excellent surrogates
for social costs and benefits, and the producer's choice among the
four options, including the choice to flare, will conserve natural
resources. 116
The cost of shutting in the oil production consists of the time
value of the deferred net revenues from production. The out-of-
pocket cost of reinjecting the associated gas in the reservoir fre-
quently is high, but that cost is offset (partially, fully, or more than
fully, depending on the facts) by the present value of the expected
future benefits of reinjection in two forms-expected net revenues
from future production of the reinjected gas and improvements in
the drive mechanism for producing all hydrocarbons from the reser-
voir. The cost of selling the gas on a current basis at the best avail-
able price consists of the out-of-pocket cost of transporting the gas
to market plus the opportunity cost of declining to reinject the gas-
114 Order of Oklahoma Corporation Comm'n promulgating Rule 1-305.
115 See, e.g., Challenger Minerals, Inc. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., No. 84-C-357-E
(N.D. Okla. Sep. 9, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
116 S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 197-98, 204, 235.
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the precise converse of the cost of reinjection. Finally, the cost of
flaring the associated gas is an opportunity cost. It consists of the
greater of: (1) the marginal net revenues that would result from a
decision to sell the gas on a current basis; or, (2) the present value
of the future benefits expected as a result of a decision to reinject
the gas in the reservoir.
Two characteristics of this framework bear emphasis. First, the
outcome is entirely fact-specific; a prudent producer's choice among
the four options depends entirely on the production mechanism of
the reservoir, plus the present and expected future conditions in the
markets for oil and gas. Second, in a unitized field, this decision-
making framework will consistently yield a choice by the producer
that maximizes the present value of the natural resources to soci-
ety-the only rational definition of conservation. 1 7 The producer
will flare the associated gas if and only if the cost of reinjection ex-
ceeds the benefits of reinjection and the cost of transporting the as-
.sociated gas to market exceeds the value the market places on the
gas. In short, the decision to flare associated gas in this situation
necessarily furthers conservation.' 18 Any contrary definition of con-
servation is absurd. For instance, the forced sale of gas with a mar-
ket value less than the cost of transporting the gas to market
involves a waste of society's resources, the opposite of conservation.
If the reservoir is owned by many parties and is not unitized,
however, the producer's decision-making framework changes con-
siderably. The most significant difference is in the costs and bene-
fits of reinjection. Under the rule of capture, the producer will not
be able to internalize all of the benefits of reinjection. Such bene-
fits, including both the expected value of future net revenues from
production of the reinjected gas and the improved reservoir mecha-
nism for production of all hydrocarbons, will be externalized to a
large extent to other owners of the reservoir." 19 Thus, without uni-
tization, the imperfect property rights in oil and gas will distort a
producer's decision-making in favor of flaring and against reinject-
ing. This is why, in some cases, state limitations on gas flaring actu-
ally do further conservation goals. By prohibiting flaring, state
agencies sometimes induce unitization, 20 which in turn sometimes
yields a decision to reinject rather than to flare associated gas.
Compelling unwilling purchasers to buy associated gas at a
price greater than the value assigned the gas by the market cannot
eliminate this potential distortion. If the present market value of
117 Id. at 71, 129.
118 Id. at 204, 235.
119 Id., at 47.120 Id., at 23-24, 47, 124; J. WEAVER, supra note 3 1, at 143-48.
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the gas exceeds the cost of transporting it to market, it should and
will be produced and sold. If the transportation costs exceed the
value assigned the gas by the market, it should not and will not be
sold, absent state distortion of the market through priority-of-
purchase regulations. Whether the gas not sold will be flared or
reinjected depends on the economics of those two options. The
state has the power to insure that the producer will make that deci-
sion in a manner that furthers conservation by exercising its regula-
tory power to unitize the field. If the state encounters difficulty in
that process, it can make unitization more attractive to many produ-
cers by the combination of limiting flaring of associated gas and re-
fusing to provide producers a state-guaranteed market for associated gas.
Thus, priority-of-purchase regulations cannot further conservation;
rather, they relieve the pressure on producers to take the action that
can further conservation-field-wide unitization.
4. Regulation of Allowable Production
State regulations restricting the level of production of oil and
gas "allowable" from any well or lease form the core of state conser-
vation regulation.' 2 1 Among other functions, such allowables pro-
tect correlative rights in oil.122 If the allowable production of oil is
set in proportion to reserves, then drainage of oil among leases,
drilling units, and owners cannot take place. In the case of oil, the
posted price system insures that oil available for sale is purchased;
the allowable level of oil production equals the actual level of
production.
The allowables system is much less effective as a means of pro-
tecting correlative rights in gas. 123 Because most gas is sold under
long-term contracts, 124 and because take-or-pay provisions vary
widely, 125 the allowable level of production varies dramatically from
the actual level of production in many cases.
A slight variation on an earlier hypothetical illustrates the prob-
lem. Assume that only three parties own all the gas in a common
pool in equal portions. Assume further that the gas sales contracts
of the three owners vary in critical respects because of the differing
market and regulatory conditions that existed when they entered
into those contracts. Deliverability from each owner's reserves is
identical-5000 MMBtu per day. Producer A's contract requires
pipeline X to take or pay for eighty percent of deliverability, or 4000
121 S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 150-51.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
123 Martin, supra note 60, at 270.
124 Pierce, supra note 16, at 77-82.
125 See supra text accompanying notes 16-26.
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MMBtu. Producer B's contract requires pipeline Y to take or pay for
100% of the allowable production set by the state agency. Producer
C's contract does not obligate pipeline Z to take or pay for any mini-
mum quantity of gas. Two of the three pipelines, X and Z, have
overcontracted for gas; therefore, they pursue a strategy of minimiz-
ing their gas purchases without having to pay for gas not taken. The
third, Y, has not overcontracted and wants to maximize its
purchases from the Hugoton Basin because it can obtain that gas at
a particularly favorable price.
This simplified example illustrates the problems states encoun-
ter in protecting correlative rights in gas by setting allowables. If
the example is extended to cover thousands of owners with widely
varying contracts with many different purchasers, this hypothetical
sets the stage for the Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC)
change in allowables policy that the United States Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for further consideration in the wake of its
Transco decision. 126
The Hugoton Basin underlies over one thousand square miles
in Kansas. Thousands of parties own the gas in the Basin. Approxi-
mately a dozen purchasers buy gas from the Basin under widely var-
ying contracts. The Basin is not unitized. Because of the relatively
simple producing mechanism in the reservoir, lack of unitization
creates only modest potential to interfere with the state's conserva-
tion goal. Seemingly intractable correlative rights problems, how-
ever, plague the Basin.
The KCC attempted to protect the correlative rights of the
thousands of owners of Hugoton Basin gas by establishing for each
owner a maximum allowable rate of production based on propor-
tionate ownership of reserves. The aggregate allowable for the Ba-
sin is based on the KCC's estimate of total market demand for gas
from the Basin, which the KCC based principally on nominations
that the pipeline purchasers provided. Because the KCC has no
power to compel purchasers to buy gas at the level of allowable pro-
duction, 127 however, it permits underproduced owners to accumu-
late underages. Traditionally, the underages were cancelled
periodically, but they were subject to revival when a producer's pur-
126 Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 237 Kan. 248, 699 P.2d
1002 (1985), vacated, 475 U.S. 1002 (1986). There is one other variation between the
hypothetical facts and the actual situation in the Hugoton Basin. Because the contracts
for Hugoton gas are very old, none of those contracts have take-or-pay clauses based on
deliverability. I included such a contract in my hypothetical because they are typical of
most contracts entered into during the late 1970s and early 1980s and because their
existence poses an additional set of problems in setting allowables. See Martin, supra
note 60, at 282.
127 Compare ratable take orders. See supra text accompanying notes 81-99.
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chaser was in a position to take more than its allowable to reduce
the cumulative underage.1 28
In theory, this regulatory approach protects correlative rights
over time. It recognizes that producers can be out of balance at any
given moment, but attempts to avoid net long-term drainage by per-
mitting underproduced owners to catch up with overproduced own-
ers. Yet it is an understatement to say that the method has proved
ineffective in practice.
Because of differences in contract terms and differences in each
pipeline purchaser's market situation, some purchasers have con-
sistently been taking much larger volumes from the Hugoton Basin
than others for a decade.1 29 The accumulated overages of produ-
cers dependent on one group of purchasers have grown steadily for
many years, as have the accumulated underages of producers de-
pendent upon a different group of purchasers.' 30 In short, because
of differences in contracts and sustained differences in the purchas-
ing practices of the various pipelines, one group of producers has
drained substantial volumes of gas reserves owned by another
group of producers.
In 1982, the KCC examined this situation and concluded that
its old system was unlikely to protect correlative rights over any
foreseeable period of time. The KCC had every reason to believe
that when the reservoir finally depletes in a few decades, the favored
group of producers will have gained considerable wealth by selling
gas owned by the disfavored group of producers. 31 The KCC at-
tempted to improve the fairness of its regulatory policy by amend-
ing its rules concerning cancellation and reinstatement of
accumulated underages. Henceforth, a producer with an accumu-
lated underage would be subject to permanent cancellation of its un-
derage unless it applied for reinstatement and began to reduce the
underage through takes in excess of allowables by a series of dates
the KCC specified. 13 2
This change placed considerable pressure on the pipeline pur-
chasers whose low level of takes had created large accumulated un-
derages for their producer-suppliers. If those pipelines did not
increase their takes by the specified dates, they risked through
drainage permanent loss of access to the favorably priced gas
reserves contractually dedicated to them in the Hugoton Basin.
While the KCC order was directed only to producers, its principal
128 Northwest Cent. Pipeline, 237 Kan. at 252-53, 699 P.2d at 1008.
129 Id. at 252, 699 P.2d at 1008.
130 Id., 699 P.2d at 1008.
131 Id. at 261, 699 P.2d at 1013-14.
132 Id. at 253, 699 P.2d at 1008.
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message was to pipeline purchasers-start purchasing the low-
priced Hugoton gas you have tied up through contracts or risk per-
manent loss of access to a portion of that gas.
The pipelines that had been purchasing at a low level appealed
the KCC order to the Kansas Supreme Court. A six-justice majority
found the order a reasonable and lawful response to an extremely
challenging regulatory problem. One justice dissented. He opined
that the order was unconstitutional because its effect was to compel
interstate pipelines involuntarily to increase their purchases from
the Hugoton Basin, contrary to Congress's intent in the NGPA to
permit market forces to determine the supply, demand, and price of
gas. 133 He argued that the KCC's real error lay in setting the aggre-
gate level of allowables in the Basin above the purchasing pipelines'
actual level of aggregate demand. 34 The Supreme Court, appar-
ently influenced by the dissenting opinion in the Kansas Supreme
Court, reversed and remanded the KCC order to the Kansas
Supreme Court with instructions to reconsider the case in light of
Transco. 13 5
If the Supreme Court ultimately addresses the issues involved
in state allowables regulation through the narrow, one-dimensional
analysis reflected in the majority opinion in Transco, it will hold the
KCC order, and every other form of state oil and gas conservation
regulation, invalid.' 36 The KCC order, like the allowables policies
in effect in most producing states, 137 clearly affects the supply and
demand for gas and, ultimately, the price of gas. The KCC order
deserves a much more careful analysis, one that incorporates the
important principle articulated in the dissenting opinion in
Transco-state regulation that responds to imperfections in property
rights is entirely consistent with reliance upon market forces. 138
A good starting point from which to begin analyzing the KCC
order is to consider the effect of the alternative suggested by the
dissenting opinion in the Kansas Supreme Court; the KCC should
base its allowables on actual demand for Hugoton gas as reflected in
133 Id. at 270-75, 699 P.2d at 1020-21.
134 Id. at 270, 699 P.2d at 1019.
135 Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1002 (1986).
136 "To the extent that Congress denied FERC the power to regulate affirmatively
particular aspects of the first sale of gas, it did so because it wanted to leave determina-
tion of supply and first-sale price to the market." Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp.
v. State Oil & Gas Bd., 474 U.S. 409, 422 (1986). "The purpose of the NGPA with
respect to high-cost gas is to eliminate governmental controls on the wellhead price of
such gas." Id. at 432-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137 See, e.g., Anderson, The Texas Approach to Gas Proration and Ratable Take, 57 U.
CoLo. L. REv. 199 (1986); Martin, supra note 60; Pierce, Natural Gas Prorationing in New
Mexico: An Attempt at Just and Equitable Allocation, 57 U. CoLo. L. REv. 301 (1986).
138 474 U.S. at 434.
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pipeline nominations.13 9 This sounds good until you consider all its
implications. Assume the three pipelines indicate to the KCC that
they plan to purchase the following quantities of Hugoton gas dur-
ing the next allowable period: pipeline X-2000 MMBtu; pipeline
Y-5000 MMBtu; pipeline Z-0 MMBtu. Assuming further that the
pipelines' representations are honest, 140 according to the dissenting
justice the aggregate demand for Hugoton gas is 7000 MMBtu, and
the allowable for each of the three producers should be 2333
MMBtu. Such an allowable would have three potential effects.
First, it might provide pipeline X an excuse for failure to perform its
take-or-pay contract with producer A'41-an effect inconsistent with
relying upon market forces to determine gas prices and harmful to
both the producer and the state.' 42 Second, it would preclude pipe-
line Y from purchasing all the Hugoton gas it wishes to purchase-
another effect inconsistent with reliance upon the market and harm-
ful to the producer, the state, the pipeline, and consumers depen-
dent upon that pipeline. 143 Third, unless the KCC put teeth in its
allowables policy, as it did in the order the dissenting justice found
unlawful, the 2333 MMBtu allowable for the producer who sells to
pipeline Z will be ineffective as a means of protecting that pro-
ducer's correlative rights. Pipeline Z will purchase no Hugoton gas
whether the allowable is 2333 MMBtu, 3000 MMBtu or 5000
MMBtu, as long as it can do so while simultaneously preserving its
right to reinstate its underage and to purchase amounts in excess of
the allowable at any time in the future.
139 237 Kan. at 269-75, 699 P.2d at 1019-23.
140 This is an heroic assumption. Purchasers have an obvious strategic incentive to
mislead the agency concerning the volume of gas they intend to purchase. If, for in-
stance, pipeline X actually wants to purchase 2000 MMBtu from a prorated pool, it has a
powerful incentive to overstate its intentions if it believes that pipelines Y and Z plan to
nominate less than 2000 MMBtu and to understate its intentions if it believes that pipe-
lines Y and Z plan to nominate more than 2000 MMBtu. State agency processes for
determining allowables invariably evolve into multiparty strategic games.
The agency's goal in such proceedings-to set aggregate allowables based on mar-
ket demand-is analytically impossible. Quantity demanded can have no meaning with-
out considering price. See Martin, supra note 60, at 289; see also American Exploration
Co. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 779 F.2d 310, 313 (6th Cir. 1985) (district
court's interpretation of "market demand" in gas sale contract as varying according to
price "accords with the most basic principles of economics").
141 See Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 102, 105
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Danden Petroleum, Inc. v. Northern Natural Gas Co.,
615 F. Supp. 1093 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Martin, supra note 60, at 270-71, 282. For more
detailed discussion of this issue, see Pierce, State Non-Utility Regulation of Natural Gas Pro-
duction, Transportation and Marketing, 33 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1 (1987).
142 See Pierce, supra note 6, at 353-57.
143 See K. ARROW & J. KALT, PETROLEUM PRICE REGULATION: SHOULD WE DECON-
TROL? 15 (1979); P. MERRILL, THE REGULATION AND DEREGULATION OF NATURAL GAS IN
THE U.S. 60 (1981); Pierce, Government Intervention in the Market for Oil and Gas: Price Con-
trols, An Excise Tax, or Deregulation?, I VA.J. NAT. RES. L. 229, 238-39 (1981).
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It is tempting to suggest that the courts should hold unconstitu-
tional all regulation of allowable production rates. All such regula-
tion certainly affects the supply, demand, and price of gas, and, no
matter how it is implemented, it serves poorly the state's goals of
conservation and protection of correlative rights to natural gas.' 44
The courts should resist this temptation, however, for two reasons.
First, allowables regulation, though crude and clumsy, does further
legitimate state purposes.' 45 It would be extremely difficult for fed-
eral courts to distinguish between good and bad regulation of oil
and gas production levels through use of any conceivable constitu-
tionally based test. Second, unlike state regulation of purchasing
practices,' 46 state regulation of allowable production levels has only
limited potential to distort the operation of the market for oil and
gas. In other words, state regulation of oil and gas production
probably yields net benefits to society in the aggregate, and federal
courts are institutionally ill-suited to distinguish among the various
types of production regulation through use of a constitutionally
based test.
Viewing the natural gas correlative rights problem alone, it is
impossible to predict with any confidence whether the new KCC al-
lowables policy, or the new policies that other states are now imple-
menting, will further the state's legitimate purpose. Courts should
leave that hazardous process of prediction to the state agencies
charged with responsibility for the task. 147 Moreover, each state's
system of allowables undoubtedly furthers other goals in other con-
texts-protection of correlative rights to oil and conservation of nat-
ural resources-often in subtle ways that federal courts are unlikely
to understand.1 48 If courts get into the process of routinely review-
ing all state regulations of oil and gas production through use of a
constitutional test, they undoubtedly will err and invalidate many
regulations that benefit both the state and the nation. Federal courts
should enter this arena only if they see potential for state regulation
of production levels to distort in significant ways the operation of
the markets for oil and gas. Allowables regulations present no such
potential.
The KCC's new allowables policy illustrates the limited extent
144 S. MCDONALD, supra note 14, at 183-96; Martin, supra note 60, at 270.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 58-62.
146 See supra text accompanying notes 81-100, 105-20.
147 See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, amended,
311 U.S. 614 (1940) (refusing to engage in detailed review of a classic example of a
"bad" proration decision on the basis that the state had entrusted a difficult regulatory
task to an agency with greater expertise than a court).
148 S. McDONALD, supra note 14, at 47, 49, 155-58;J. WEAVER, supra note 31, at 316-
19; Martin, supra note 60, at 270.
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to which states can further their producer constituents' interests at
the expense of out-of-state consumers through regulation of pro-
duction. Unlike orders to purchase directed at pipelines, allowables
orders have no direct effect on purchasers. At most, the state can
give pipeline purchasers the message that they risk permanent loss
of dedicated reserves through drainage if they do not increase their
level of purchases. Then the pipeline must decide whether it, and
its customers, are better served by increasing the present level of
purchases or risking loss of access to some reserves through drain-
age. To present pipelines with this choice in an effort to protect the
correlative rights of the owners of gas is entirely appropriate. The
owners of the gas suffer significantly from drainage; the only effect
of the state's action is to force the pipelines who cause this damage
to internalize a modest portion of the costs they impose on owners.
The effect on out-of-state consumers is only incidental to the state's
primary purpose of protecting correlative rights.
It seems inherently implausible that producing states could fur-
ther their interests at the nation's expense through any type of regu-
lation directed to oil and gas producers. Several producing states
recently have made the ultimate threat to use allowables policy for
the express purpose of distorting the markets for oil and gas. The
Texas Railroad Commission, echoed by the states of Louisiana and
Oklahoma, has threatened to reduce its allowables to a level below
market demand in order to help its financially distressed producer
constituents by increasing the price of oil and gas.149 But that is
only an empty threat; any reduction in allowables that would harm
the nation by reducing the supply of oil and gas available and in-
creasing oil and gas prices would cause disproportionate harm to
producers and to producing states. Moreover, under present and
foreseeable future market conditions, no producing state in the
United States has market power.' 50 If a state reduces the allowable
level of production, any gain in revenues resulting from price in-
creases would be more than offset by a loss of revenues attributable
to the reduced volume of oil and gas sold in the state.
Federal courts should allow state conservation agencies to con-
tinue to exercise considerable discretion in regulating oil and gas
production in recognition of three realities. First, some such regula-
tion furthers both state and national goals, albeit crudely. Second,
there is no realistic potential for producing states to further their
interests and the interests of their producer constituents at the na-
tion's expense through changes in their allowables policies. Finally,
federal courts are unlikely to succeed in attempting to distinguish
149 See TRC MVay Order Cut in Oil Production, OIL & GAs J., Oct. 27, 1986, at 41.
150 See McLure, supra note 68, at 259-60.
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between good and bad regulation of production. Federal courts
should only prohibit states from regulating interstate gas purchas-
ers, as opposed to producers.
A POSTSCRIPT-WHAT CAN PRODUCING STATES Do?
This analysis of the regulatory tools most frequently used by
state regulators today may seem to suggest that state regulators are
virtually powerless to further the important goals of conservation
and protection of correlative rights. The only effective method of
protecting correlative rights in natural gas-regulating gas purchas-
ers-is beyond state power because it interferes directly and sub-
stantially with federal goals. Regulation of production only crudely
and imperfectly furthers that goal and the goal of conservation.
What can and should a conscientious state regulator do to further
the legitimate and important state goals for which he has
responsibility?
The first answer is easy and clear-exert every conceivable ef-
fort to obtain field-wide unitization of all reservoirs. This is a chal-
lenging task, given the incentive for many owners to object to
unitization for strategic reasons and the difficulty of devising fair
and equitable methods of allocating production among the owners
of a reservoir. To the extent the regulator is successful, however,
the task offers the promise of large benefits to the state and to the
nation, as well as to producers and consumers. Field-wide unitiza-
tion automatically eliminates at the source the inefficiency, inequity,
and distortion created by the imperfect property rights in oil and
gas. 51
The time could not be better for a major new effort to obtain
universal field-wide unitization. The period of greatest unitization
in the history of the industry in the United States was the 1960s,
when the depressed condition of oil and gas markets forced all natu-
ral resource owners to look carefully at ways to cut their costs and to
perform more efficiently.' 52 We have recently entered a similar pe-
riod in which enhanced efficiency is vital to natural resource owners,
as well as to producing states, consumers, and the nation.
Even universal field-wide unitization alone, however, would not
eliminate the acute correlative rights problems that exist in the con-
text of natural gas marketing. 153 Here again, however, there is rea-
son for optimism. If FERC is successful in implementing its equal
access to pipelines rule' 54 and in eliminating the last vestiges of fed-
151 See supra text accompanying notes 41-53.
152 J. WEAVER, supra note 31, at 317.
153 See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
154 FERC Order No. 436, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Well-
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eral regulation of wellhead prices,' 55 the gas market eventually will
operate efficiently.' 56 In a properly functioning market, gas owners
can and will protect their correlative rights adequately by con-
tract.1 57 Unfortunately, however, the route Congress chose to this
desirable end is long and will continue to expose some producers to
inequities for many years. Even at the end of that long road, there
still may be some residual correlative rights problems because of the
substantial economies of scale in marketing natural gas.
States are not powerless to address these short-term inequities
directly and effectively, as Oklahoma has demonstrated.158 Produc-
ing states can impose regulations like Oklahoma's share-the-con-
tract statute, thereby giving individual owners the option of
delegating the marketing function to the unit operator.159 If share-
the-contract regulations are combined with universal field-wide uni-
tization, there is every reason to expect that producing states can
address simultaneously and completely the dual goals of conserva-
tion and protection of correlative rights.
head Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,408 (1985) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 2, 157, 250,
284, 375, and 381).
155 FERC Order No. 451, Ceiling Prices; Old Gas Pricing Structure, 51 Fed. Reg.
22,168 (1986) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. §§ 154, 157, 270, 271, and 284) (permitting
producers to renegotiate prices of "old" flowing gas from prior artificially low ceiling
price to market price subject to single alternative ceiling in specified conditions where
contracts authorize such a price increase).
156 S. WILLIAMS, supra note 26, at 46. See generally J. KALT & F. SCHULLER, DRAWING
THE LINE ON NATURAL GAS REGULATION (1987).
157 Barlow, supra note 79, at 6-7.
158 See supra text accompanying notes 10 1-04.
159 Other states are considering similar actions. See Geraud, Taking Natural Gas Rata-
bly in Wyoming, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 225 (1986); Martin, supra note 60, at 283-86.
1987]
